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Abstract
This paper investigates price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly market,
where a state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes against a profit-
maximizing private firm. We use a differential game approach with a Hotelling
spatial competition framework. We extend Cellini et al. (2018) by incorporating
a state-owned public firm and derive open- and closed-loop solutions. The steady-
state quality levels are optimal in the open-loop solution. Numerical results show
that the steady-state quality level of the public firm in the closed-loop solution
does not necessarily lower than that in the open-loop solution. As a private firm’s
investment is large, the public firm’s incentive for quality improvement increases
since there exists intertemporal strategic substitutability between investment and
quality. Competition and privatization policies are neutral under the open-loop
solution but not under the closed-loop solution. Competition policy improves
social welfare with an increase in quality and privatization policy improves it
with an decrease in quality in the closed-loop solution.
JEL classification: H42 L13
Keywords : Mixed oligopoly, Privatization, Differential-game, Quality.
1 Introduction
Though many state-owned public firms have been privatized over the last decades,
state-owned public firms still play essential roles in healthcare industries, for instance
China, Japan, and Korea. In China and Korea, it is common for patients to choose
treatments that are not covered by public insurance. In Japan, some advanced medical
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care is not covered by public insurance, for example, treatments of cancer and infertility.
Providers are usually allowed to freely determine prices of treatments not covered by
public insurance. Cellini et al. (2018) discuss price and quality competition between
profit-maximizing firms in healthcare markets whose prices are not regulated in US and
European countries by employing a differential game approach. The purpose of this
paper is to discuss the price and quality competition in the mixed market by employ-
ing a differential game approach. In these countries, advances in medical technology
have made it possible for people to receive higher medical care and has increased life
expectancy. On the other hand, the provision of high-quality medical treatment and
population aging entails an increase in health care costs. We also discuss reforms in the
healthcare industries.
We extend Cellini et al. (2018), which employ a differential game approach with
a Hotelling spatial competition framework to a mixed duopoly model. We use the
Hotelling framework, whose line represents geographical distances between individuals
and hospitals. We build the model as follows: a public firm maximizes the discounted
stream of social welfare. In contrast, a private firm maximizes the discounted stream of
profit. We use differential game approach, where quality provision requires investments.
Treatment quality is a major concern in healthcare markets. Provision of high-quality
medical care requires expensive medical equipment (e.g., MRI, CT) and the training
of doctors. Recently, the increase in health care costs is a serious problem. The static
model cannot analyze the effect of an increase in health care costs due to competition
in quality among firms. We also investigate how competition and privatization policies
affect social welfare.
We derive two kinds of solutions represented by different decision rules: the open-
loop decision rule and the closed-loop decision rule. If the firms use open-loop decision
rules, they can observe the initial state but cannot observe the evolution of state. They
commit to optimal plans at the beginning of the game and stick to them over the
time horizon. If firms use closed-loop decision rules, they can observe the evolution of
state and their actions depend on the observed state. Therefore, there is a dynamic
strategic interaction in the closed-loop solution. The firm’s quality improvement affects
its opponents’ decisions. We compare the steady-state levels of qualities of the firms in
two solution concepts.
When firms use open-loop decision rules, quality is optimally provided. The reason
is that, in our model, there is no strategic interaction under the open-loop solution
and the marginal profit of quality is equal to the marginal social welfare of quality
as in standard spatial competition models. When firms use closed-loop decision rules,
the numerical results indicate that the steady-state quality level of the public firm can
be higher or lower than that in the open-loop solution. Two effects determine this
relationship.
Firstly, the public firm’s incentive for quality improvement decreases as its share
decreases. The dynamic strategic interaction increases the private firm’s incentive to
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increase quality in the closed-loop solution. The public firm’s market share is lower as
the private firm ’s quality level is higher. In this situation, the incentive of the public
firm for quality improvement in the closed-loop solution is lower than in the open-loop
solution.
Secondary, an increase of the public firm’s quality level reduces the optimal quality
investment of the private firm since there is intertemporal strategic substitutability
between quality and investment in the model. Then, a higher investment level by the
public firm has a trade-off between today’s lower investment cost by the private firm,
which is cost saving today, and future lower quality level by the private firm, which
is future efficiency loss. Therefore, the steady-state quality of the public firm in the
closed-loop solution is higher than that in the open-loop solution when the public firm’s
incentive to crowd out the private firm’s investment is sufficiently large.
Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008) also consider quality and price competition in a static
Hotelling model with partial privatization. They show that the first best is achieved
in the simultaneous-move game. They also showed that the social-welfare maximizing
public firm’s quality level is always less than the first-best quality level in the sequential-
move games, as in Matsumura and Matsushima (2004). However, we indicate that the
quality of the social-welfare maximizing public firm in the closed-loop solution can be
higher than that in the open-loop solution while quality is optimally provided in the
open-loop solution. Cellini et al. (2018) show that steady-state quality is increasing
in the degree of competition in the closed-loop solution. This result also holds in our
model. Furthermore, numerical analysis indicates that the difference between steady-
state qualities is increasing in the degree of competition and competition policy improves
social welfare in the mixed duopoly. It is in contrast to the numerical result that
privatization policy improves social welfare by decreasing quality in the closed-loop
solution.
Our paper is related to the literature that deals with R&D activities in a mixed
oligopoly. Laine and Ma (2017) and Kuo et al. (2019) also investigate price and
quality competition in the mixed duopoly market within the Hotelling framework.
Sanjo (2009) investigates quality competition under price regulation by employing the
Hotelling framework. A vast amount of literature investigates cost-reducing activities
in the mixed oligopoly. Nishimori and Ogawa (2002) show that the entry of private
firms reduces the public firm’s incentive to undertake cost-reducing investment. Mat-
sumura and Matsushima (2004) obtain that private firm engages in excessive strategic
cost-reducing activities than the public firm. Heywood (2009) shows that an R&D ri-
valry reduces the optimal degree of privatization. Buehler and Wey (2014) show that a
state-owned firm crowds out investment by a private firm under several conditions. On
the other hand, there are a few pieces of literature studying mixed markets employing
a differential game approach.1
1Futagami et al. (2019) employ a differential game approach to investigate optimal privatization of
a dynamic mixed oligopoly model.
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Our paper is also related to the literature that deals with hospital quality competi-
tion in a Hotelling framework with a differential game approach. Brekke et al. (2010)
and Cellini et al. (2018) set quality as a stock variable. Brekke et al. (2010) find that
quality levels are equal under open- and closed-loop solutions when the marginal cost
is constant under price regulation. On the other hand, Cellini et al. (2018) shows that
quality level is lower under the closed-loop solution than under the open-loop solution
in an unregulated market since there is a strategic incentive to reduce quality invest-
ments to dampen future price competition. Brekke et al. (2012) and Siciliani et al.
(2013) set demands as stock variables. They assume that the demands move sluggishly
over time. Siciliani et al. (2013) investigate quality competition by introducing a mo-
tivated provider that maximizes a weighted sum of total utility of the consumers the
provider serve and its profit, and find that a decrease of the number of consumers the
regulator serve reduces provider’s incentive for quality improvement. By taking quality
as a state variable, Bisceglia et al. (2019) also investigate quality competition where
regional regulators consider surpluses of their residents. In this paper, we introduce a
firm who considers not only its profit and utilities of consumers but also its competi-
tor’s profit. We find that sufficient large investment by the private firm increases the
social-welfare maximizing public firm’s incentive for quality improvement. If there ex-
ists dynamic strategic interaction between quality and quality investment, the incentive
of the provider, who considers its competitor’s profit, is affected by not only its share
but also the trade-off between the competitor’s investment cost and the competitor’s
future quality level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model. In
section 3 and section 4, we derive the open-loop solution and the closed-loop solution.
Section 5 discuss steady-state qualities and the competition and privatization policies
by using numerical analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Consider the line segment [0, 1], where firm 0 is located at 0 and firm 1 at 1. The
locations of firms are fixed. Let firm 0 be a fully state-owned public firm and firm
1 be a private firm. The product of firm i has quality qi (i = 0, 1). A unit mass of
consumers is distributed uniformly on the line segment. Each consumer demands one
unit of product or service. The utility of a consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1] who will buy
from firm i, located at zi ∈ {0, 1}, is given by
U(x, zi) = v + kqi − τ |x− zi| − pi, (1)
where pi is the price of firm i, v > 0 is the gross valuation of consumption, k > 0 is the
marginal willingness to pay for quality, and τ > 0 is the marginal transportation cost.
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Therefore, the demand for firm 0 is xD0 and that for firm 1 is 1− xD0 .
We assume that firms can not adjust quality instantaneously. Quality improvement
requires investment. Firms invest in improving their quality at each point in time
t ∈ [0,∞). Assuming time is continuous, the law of motion of quality is given by
q̇i(t) = Ii(t)− δqi(t), (3)
where Ii(t) is the investment in quality at time t and quality depreciates at a constant
rate, δ > 0.
We assume that firms have identical production technologies. The cost function of
firm i is given by








where c > 0 is a constant marginal cost of production and γ and β are positive con-
stants. We assume that the cost function is increasing and strictly convex in quality and
investment. Expensive materials and skilled workers are required to achieve a higher
quality level. Besides, a higher quality level requires higher maintenance costs. Profit
of firm i is
πi(p0(t), p1(t), Ii(t), q0(t), q1(t)) =








The consumer surplus at each point in time is




(v + kq0(t)− p0(t)− τz)dz +
∫ 1
xD0 (t)
(v + kq1(t)− p1(t)− τ(1− z))dz,





2 + (1− xD0 (t))2
}
. (6)
The producer surplus at each point in time is
PS(p0(t), p1(t), I0(t), I1(t), q0(t), q1(t), )
= π0(p0(t), p1(t), I0(t), q0(t), q1(t)) + π1(p0(t), p1(t), I1(t), q0(t), q1(t)). (7)
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Therefore, the social welfare at each point in time is
SW (I0(t), I1(t), q0(t), q1(t))
= CS(p0(t), p1(t), q0(t), q1(t)) + PS(p0(t), p1(t), I0(t), I1(t), q0(t), q1(t)),




















SW (I0(t), I1(t), q0(t), q1(t)) e
−ρtdt, (9)





π1(p0(t), p1(t), It(t), q0(t), q1(t)) e
−ρtdt. (10)
From equations (9) and (10), we can see that the objective function of firm 0 depends
on both I0 and I1, while that of firm 1 depends only on I1.
We derive the open-loop solution and the closed-loop solution, which have different
information sets available to firms. If firms use open-loop decision rules, firms can
observe the initial state but cannot observe the evolution of state. Firms have to
decide the optimal plan at the beginning of the game and do not revise it over the
time horizon. Hence, the open-loop solution is weakly time consistent.2 If firms use
closed-loop decision rules, firms observe the evolution of state over time. Firms choose
price and quality depend on the current state. Hence, the closed-loop solution is time
consistent.
3 Open-loop solution







subject to q̇0(t) = I0(t)− δq0(t),
q̇1(t) = I1(t)− δq1(t),
q0(0) = q00 > 0,
q1(0) = q10 > 0.
2The open-loop solution is weakly time consistent if optimal rules do not change when firms re-
consider their rules on the equilibrium trajectory. That is time consistent if it holds not only on the
equilibrium trajectory but also off the trajectory.
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subject to q̇0(t) = I0(t)− δq0(t),
q̇1(t) = I1(t)− δq1(t),
q0(0) = q00 > 0,
q1(0) = q10 > 0.
Solving maximization problems, we have the following results. In the rest of this
paper, we omit time argument t for notational simplicity. Firms set equal equilibrium
prices as follows:
p0 = c+ τ − k(q0 − q1), (11)
p1 = c+ τ + k(q1 − q0). (12)
From (11) and (12), we can easily obtain that (p0 − kq0) − (p1 − kq1) > 0 iff q1 > q0.
Hence, firm 0 is less aggressive if its quality is lower than that of firm 1.
The following equation and state equations (3) describe the system.







τ + k(qi − qj)
}
, i = 1, 2, i ̸= j. (13)
This is symmetry across the firms in spite of the difference in their purposes. The
steady-state quality level in the open-loop solution is
qOL =
k
2(β + γδ(δ + ρ))
. (14)
We here assume βτ−k2 > 0 to ensure the existence of the open-loop solution. Details of
derivations are described in Appendix A. From (14) and Appendix B, we can see that
the steady-state quality level in the open-loop solution coincides with the first-best
steady state quality level.
Proposition 1 If the firms use open-loop decision rules, the steady-state quality levels
are optimal.
The reason is that the private firm’s marginal profit of quality is equal to the marginal




= kx1. An increase
in q1 increases aggregate utilities of consumers who choose firm 1 by kx1. It also
increases aggregate utility of consumers who choose firm 1 by inducing new demand.
The second effect is cancelled out by a decrease in aggregate utility of consumers who
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An increase in q1 directly increases firm 1’s demand and indirectly affects it through
prices. The second effects vanish and ∂π1(q0,q1)
∂q1
= kx1 holds since the demand function
is linear and symmetric in prices. Cellini et al. (2018) assume two symmetric profit
maximising firms and states that quality is optimally provided when they use open-loop
decision rules. It is obvious that the same result holds for the mixed duopoly.
4 Closed-loop solution
In this section, we derive the closed-loop solution. Firms’ price and investment decisions
depend on qualities at each point in time, when they use closed-loop decision rules. We
use the value function approach to derive the closed-loop solution. From (9) and (10),
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of firm 0 is given by
ρV 0(q0, q1) = max
{
SW + V 0q0(q0, q1)(I0 − δq0) + V
0
q1
(q0, q1)(I1 − δq1)
}
, (15)
and that of firm 1 is given by





(q0, q1)(I1 − δq1) + V 1q0(q0, q1)(I0 − δq0)
}
, (16)
where V i(q0, q1) is firm i’s value function and πi and SW are given by (5) and (8),
respectively. Since the game can be characterized as a linear quadratic game,3 we guess
the value functions as






q21 + α5q0q1, (17)






q20 + ε5q0q1, (18)
where αi and εi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are unknown constant parameters.
Maximization of the right-hand sides of (15) and (16), respectively, yields the opti-
mal pricing rules as
p0 = c+ τ − k(q0 − q1), (19)
p1 = c+ τ + k(q1 − q0). (20)
Equation (20) indicates that, for all else equal, firm 1 reacts to an increase in q0 by
reducing its price to compensate for its demand loss. Equation (19) indicates that, for
all else equal, firm 0 reacts to an increase in q1 by raising its price. The reason is that
3See Dockner et al. (2000, ch.7).
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it is desirable for the public firm, which is concerned with the social welfare, to increase
the market share with a higher quality level. As a result, firm 0 is less aggressive if its
quality is lower than that of firm 1, as mentioned in Section 3.









ε1 + ε3q1 + ε5q0
γ
. (22)
If α5 is positive (negative), there exists an intertemporal strategic complementarity
(substitutability) between q1 and I0 (See Jun and Vives (2004)). The higher q1 is, the
higher (lower) the optimal quality investment level of firm 0 is. The same is true for ε5.
Substituting (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), and (22) into (15) and (16) and collecting
terms with equal powers of qi result in simultaneous equations shown in Appendix C.
Solutions of the simultaneous equations satisfying the following conditions constitute a
globally asymptotically stable equilibrium.4
(α3 − γδ) + (ε3 − γδ) < 0, (23)
(α3 − γδ)(ε3 − γδ)− α5ε5 > 0, (24)
(α3 − ε3)2 + 4α5ε5 > 0. (25)
Derivation of the above conditions are given in Appendix D. There is a unique globally
asymptotically stable closed-loop solution, as shown in Appendix E.
5 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we rely on numerical analysis to derive the closed-loop solution. The
parameter set is as follows: ρ = 0.04, δ = 0.05, c = 0, k = 1, v = 10, β = 5. We
consider two cases: γ = 8 and γ = 24. We derive the steady-state values in qualities,
investments, prices, profits, the demand for firm 0, the consumer surplus, the producer
surplus, and social welfare for τ = 3 and τ = 7. The numerical results are shown in
Table 3, Table 1, Table 2, and Table 4. The steady-state levels of quality in the open-
loop solution on Table 1 are obtained by substituting the parameters into equation
(14). Each parameter set in this section satisfies the restriction, βτ − k2 > 0, derived
in Section 3. The steady-state levels of quality in the pure duopoly in the closed-loop
solution on Table 4 are obtained by substituting the parameters into outcomes derived
by Cellini et al. (2018).
4We assume −2α5ε5 + (1− θ)ε25 + (γs)2 + γ(β − 2fg) > 0 and −2α5ε5 + (γs)2 + γ(β − 2hg) > 0 to
ensure the solutions are real values.
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5.1 Steady-state quality
The numerical results show that the public firm’s steady-state quality level in the closed-
loop solution can be larger than in the open-loop solution depending on parameters.
Table 1 and Table 2 show that qCL0 is smaller than q
OL. However, in the case of γ = 8
and τ = 3, qCL0 is smaller than q
OL. In this case, the tables show that qCL0 = 0.09932
and qOL = 0.09929. There is a question why the public firm chooses overinvestment in
the case of γ = 8 and τ = 3 while it chooses underinvestment in other cases when firms
use closed-loop decision rules. It can be explained by dynamic strategic interaction
between firms.
(γ, τ) q0 q1 I0 I1 p0 p1 π0 π1 x0 CS PS SW
(8,3) 0.09929 0.09929 0.00496 0.00496 3 3 1.47526 1.47526 0.5 6.34929 2.95052 9.29980
(8,7) 0.09929 0.09929 0.00496 0.00496 7 7 3.47526 3.47526 0.5 1.34929 6.95052 8.29980
(24,3) 0.09789 0.09789 0.00489 0.00489 3 3 1.47576 1.47576 0.5 6.34789 2.95152 9.29940
(24,7) 0.09789 0.09789 0.00489 0.00489 7 7 3.47576 3.47576 0.5 1.34789 6.95152 8.29940
Table 1: Steady state values in the open-loop solution
(γ, τ) q0 q1 I0 I1 p0 p1 π0 π1 x0 CS PS SW
(8,3) 0.09932 0.20925 0.00497 0.01046 3.10993 3.10993 1.47323 1.50204 0.48168 6.29536 2.97527 9.27063
(8,7) 0.09927 0.20292 0.00496 0.01015 7.10365 7.10365 3.47450 3.50107 0.49260 1.29783 6.97556 8.27339
(24,3) 0.09785 0.20607 0.00489 0.01030 3.10823 3.10823 1.47383 1.50274 0.48196 6.29471 2.97657 9.27127
(24,7) 0.09784 0.19997 0.00489 0.01000 7.10213 7.10213 3.47504 3.50170 0.49271 1.29715 6.97674 8.27389
Table 2: Steady state in the closed-loop solution (Mixed duopoly )
Table 1 and Table 2 show that the private firm’s steady-state quality is higher in
the closed-loop solution than in the open-loop solution.5 When firms use closed-loop
decision rules, firms react to changes in their competitors’ quality stock. The public
firm reacts to an increase in q1 by raising its price, p0 as shown in Equation (19). This
means that the higher quality investments by the private firm today will lead to weaker
5Cellini et al. (2018) consider the case where firm 0 in this model is a profit-maximizing firm. Firm
0, the profit-maximizing firm, reacts to an increase in q1 by raising its price, p0. Hence, the private
firm’s steady-state quality is lower in the closed-loop solution than in the open-loop solution. Brekke
et al. (2010) analyzes the case where prices are regulated in Cellini et al. (2018) and shows that the
open-loop and closed-loop solutions coincide. In these papers, the results obtained by dynamic models
are similar to the ones obtained by static models, contrasting with our results.
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price competition in the future. Since weak price competition increases the private
firm’s profit, this dynamic strategic interaction increases the private firm’s incentive for
quality improvement compared to that in the open-loop solution.
The private firm’s overinvestment in quality reduces the public firm’s incentive for
quality improvement. It is well known that the incentive of the public firm for quality
improvement is increasing in its share.6 As the number of consumers who enjoy the
benefit from the quality improvement of firm 0 decreases, the marginal social benefit
by increasing q0 is smaller. The public firm’s market share is lower as the private firm’s
quality level is higher, as shown in Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008).
(γ, τ) I0 I1
(8, 3) 0.62635 -5.68352 q0 -0.10578 q1 1.27120 -5.57196 q1 -0.21734 q0
(8,7) 0.61908 -5.74415 q0 -0.04515 q1 1.24646 -5.69799 q1 -0.09130 q0
(24,3) 1.05709 -9.22074 q0 -0.18179 q1 2.14450 -9.02919 q1 -0.37334 q0
(24,7) 1.04530 -9.32493 q0 -0.07760 q1 2.10416 -9.24563 q1 -0.15689 q0
Table 3: Optimal investment rules in the closed-loop solution
The public firm’s incentive for quality improvement may be increased by dynamic
strategic interaction between quality and investment. The numerical results show that
there is intertemporal strategic substitutability. The coefficient parameters, α5 and ε5,
are negative from Table 3. That is, an increase of the social welfare-maximizing public
firm’s quality level provokes a reduction of the private firm’s quality investment. By
this intertemporal strategic substitutability, the public firm faces a trade-off between
reducing the private firm’s investment cost and encouraging the private firm’s quality
improvement. Suppose that the private firm reacts to an increase in q0 by reducing its
quality investment. This reduction results in the lower investment cost of the private
firm today and the lower quality level of the private firm in the future. The lower
investment cost is instantaneous gain, and the lower future’s quality level is future loss
from the viewpoint of social welfare maximization. If the investment cost of the private
firm is sufficiently large, the former effect dominates the later effect. Therefore, the
social welfare-maximizing public firm can have an incentive for quality investment to
crowd out the private firm’s quality investment.
The public firm’s steady-state quality level in the closed-loop solution can be larger
than in the open-loop solution since there exists intertemporal strategic substitutability.
All else equal, the private firm has a stronger incentive for quality improvement as γ and
τ is small.7 The higher private firm’s quality level reduces the social welfare-maximizing
6See Nishimori and Ogawa (2002), Matsumura and Matsushima (2004), and Ishibashi and Kaneko
(2008).
7When γ is close to zero, the constraint conditions do not hold.
11
public firm’s share. At the same time, the higher private firm’s investment increases
the social welfare-maximizing public firm’s incentive for crowding out the private firm’s
investment. If the latter effect dominates the former effect, the public firm’s steady-
state quality level in the closed-loop solution is larger than in the open-loop solution.
Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008) show that the first best is achieved in the one-shot game
simultaneous moves. This result is related to the outcome of the open-loop solution in
this paper. However, our outcome in the closed-loop solution contrasts to the results
in Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008) who indicate that the social welfare-maximizing public
firm’s quality level is lower than the optimal level in the one-shot game with sequential
moves.
5.2 Policies
We investigate how competition and privatization policies affect social welfare in the
closed-loop solution. Table 2 show that steady-state quality levels are increasing in the
degree of competition. This result is consistent with Cellini et al. (2018), who show
that steady-state quality is increasing in the degree of competition in the pure duopoly.
Furthermore, we indicate that the difference between steady-state qualities is increasing
in the degree of competition in the mixed duopoly. Table 2 shows that q1−q0 is 0.10365
in the case of τ = 7 and 0.10992 in the case of τ = 3 when γ = 8. It also shows that
x0 is 0.10213 in the case of τ = 7 and 0.10822 in the case of τ = 3 when γ = 24.
Regardless of these results, competitive policy increases social welfare since the market
share of public firm decreases.
(γ, τ) qi Ii pi πi x0 CS PS SW
(8,3) 0.06643 0.00332 3 1.48892 0.5 6.31643 2.97785 9.29428
(8,7) 0.06629 0.00331 7 3.48897 0.5 1.31629 6.97794 8.29423
(24,3) 0.06549 0.00327 3 1.48915 0.5 6.31549 2.97830 9.29379
(24,7) 0.06535 0.00327 7 3.48919 0.5 1.31535 6.97839 8.29374
Table 4: Steady state in the closed-loop solution (Pure duopoly )
We also find that privatization of the public firm improves steady-state social wel-
fare. Table 2 show that social welfare in the mixed duopoly is 9.27063 and Table 4 show
that that in the pure duopoly which is 9.29428 in the case of γ = 8 and τ = 3. Hence,
privatization improves social welfare. The same results hold for other parameter sets.
Steady-state quality levels in the closed-loop solution is less than that in the open-loop
solution as shown in Table 1. This implies that privatization reduced costs. Qualities
is optimally provided and these policies do not affect social welfare in the open-loop
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solution. However, competition policy improves social welfare by increasing quality and
privatization policy improves it by decreasing quality in the closed-loop solution.
6 Conclusion
This study investigates price and quality competition in the mixed duopoly in which
firms need investment to improve their qualities. We extend Cellini et al. (2018) to a
mixed duopoly model by considering that one of the firms is the public firm concerns
with social welfare. If the firms use open-loop decision rules, quality provision is socially
optimal. However, if the firms use closed-loop decision rules, the steady-state quality
level of the social welfare-maximizing public firm may be higher than the first-best
steady-state quality level. If there is intertemporal strategic substitutability, the social
welfare-maximizing public firm’s steady-state quality level in the closed-loop solution
can be higher than that in the open-loop solution. Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008) showed
that the social-welfare maximizing public firm’s quality level is always less than the first-
best quality level in sequential-move games by using the static Hotelling model. Finally,
the competition and privatization policies improve social welfare. Our model does
not consider partial privatization developed by Matsumura (1998). Solving differential
games with the privatization rate of the public firm as a control variable remains as a
matter to be discussed further.
Appendices
A Derivation of the open-loop solution
A.1. Derivation of the steady-state quality
The current-value Hamiltonian for firm 0 is

































0(I0 − δq0) + µ10(I1 − δq1),
(A-1)
where µ00 and µ
1
0 are the current value co-state variables associated with the two state
equations and CS is given by (6). With the help of ∂CS
∂p0






= k(1− xD0 ), we can easily obtain the first-order conditions as follows:
µ00 = γI0, (A-2)
p1 − p0 = 0, (A-3)
µ̇00 = (ρ+ δ)µ
0










µ̇10 = (ρ+ δ)µ
1










and the transversality conditions are limt→∞ e
−ρtµi0(t)qi(t) = 0, i = 0, 1.



















where µ11 and µ
0
1 are the current value co-state variables associated with the two state
equations. The first-order conditions are






− p1 − p0
2τ
− p1 − c
2τ
= 0, (A-8)
µ̇11 = (ρ+ δ)µ
1
1 + βq1 −
k
2τ
(p1 − c), (A-9)





(p1 − c), (A-10)
and the transversality conditions are limt→∞ e
−ρtµi1(t)qi(t) = 0, i = 0, 1.
Equations (A-3) and (A-8) yield the equilibrium prices as
p0 = c+ τ − k(q0 − q1), (A-11)
p1 = c+ τ + k(q1 − q0). (A-12)
Combining (A-2), (A-4), (A-7), and (A-9), we obtain












, i = 1, 2, i ̸= j. (A-13)
Imposing q̇i = İi = 0, we get the steady-state quality in the open-loop solution as
qOL =
k
2(β + γδ(δ + ρ))
. (A-14)
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A.2. Concavity of Hamiltonians
Differentiating (A-1) yields the following:

































The Hessian of Hamiltonian, H0, is negative semidefinite if equations (A-19) and (A-20)
are positive. Therefore, Hamiltonian, H0 is concave in I0, p0, and q0 if 2βτ − k2 > 0.
With a similar calculation, we find that Hamiltonian, H1, is concave in I1, p1, and q1 if
4βτ − k2 > 0.
A.3. Uniqueness and Stability for the steady state




















− φ 0 φ
1 −δ 0 0
0 φ ρ+ δ β
γ
− φ

































where φ ≡ k2
2τγ
. Letting λ be eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix, the characteristic
equation is
{
(ρ+ δ − λ)(δ + λ) + β
γ
}{






























Hence, the matrix has two positive and two negative real roots only if β
γ
−2φ > 0. This
implies that there exists a unique saddle path converging to the steady-state point if
βτ − k2 > 0.
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B Derivation of the first-best steady-state quality
In this Appendix, we derive the first-best steady-state quality. The social planner
maximizes the social welfare given by (8) by choosing the market share and each firm’s









subject to q̇0(t) = I0(t)− δq0(t),
q̇1(t) = I1(t)− δq1(t),
q0(0) = q00 > 0,
q1(0) = q10 > 0.
The current-value Hamiltonian is
















+µ0(I0 − δq0) + µ1(I1 − δq1),
(B-1)
where µ0 and µ1 are the current value co-state variables associated with the state
equations. The first-order conditions are
k(q0 − q1)− 2τxD0 + τ = 0, (B-2)
µi = γIi, (B-3)
µ̇i = (ρ+ δ)µi + βqi − kxi, (B-4)
and the transversality conditions are limt→∞ e
−ρtµi(t)qi(t) = 0, i = 0, 1. Because of
symmetry across firms, the first-best steady-state quality, q∗, is
q∗ =
k
2(β + γδ(δ + ρ))
. (B-5)
C First order conditions of Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellan equation
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations of firms are
ρV 0(q0, q1) = max
{
SW + V 0q0(q0, q1)(I0 − δq0) + V
0
q1
(q0, q1)(I1 − δq1)
}
, (C-1)









Substituting (2), (5), and (8) into (C-1) and (C-2), we have
ρV 0(q0, q1) = max
{
































+V 0q0(q0, q1)(I0 − δq0) + V
0
q1
(q0, q1)(I1 − δq1)
}
, (C-3)


















+ V 1q1(q0, q1)(I1 − δq1) + V
1
q0
(q0, q1)(I0 − δq0)
}
. (C-4)











− p1 − p0
2τ
− p1 − c
2τ
= 0. (C-6)
By (C-5) and (C-6), optimal pricing rules are
p0 = c+ τ +
2θ − 1
2θ + 1
k(q0 − q1), (C-7)
p1 = c+ τ +
1
2θ + 1
k(q1 − q0). (C-8)
Maximization of the right-hand side of (C-3) with respect to I0 and that of (C-4) with








V 1q1(q0, q1). (C-10)
We conjecture the quadratic value function of each firm as






q21 + α5q0q1, (C-11)






q20 + ε5q0q1. (C-12)
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Using (C-11) and (C-12), we can rewrite (C-9) and (C-10) in the form of linear invest-
ment strategies as
I0 =




ε1 + ε3q1 + ε5q0
γ
. (C-14)
Substituting (C-7), (C-8), and (C-11)-(C-14) into (C-3) and (C-4) results in
ρ
(

































































(α1 + α3q0 + α5q1)








































(ε1 + ε3q1 + ε5q0)




(ε2 + ε4q0 + ε5q1)(α1 + α3q0 + α5q1)− δ(ε2 + ε4q0 + ε5q1)q0.
(C-16)






























































































































































D Stability conditions of the closed-loop solution





















































The matrix, J , has two negative eigenvalues if
tr(J) < 0, det(J) > 0, tr(J)2 − 4det(J) > 0.
Hence, conditions for globally asymptotically stable equilibrium are given by
(α3 − γδ) + (ε3 − γδ) < 0, (D-2)
(α3 − γδ)(ε3 − γδ)− α5ε5 > 0, (D-3)
(α3 − ε3)2 + 4α5ε5 > 0. (D-4)
E The derivation of a unique solution
Introducing s = ρ
2
+ δ, g = k
2
τ









































































+ g = 0. (C-30’)
Solving (C-22’) for α3 gives
α3(α5, ε5) = γs±
√
(γs)2 − 2α5ε5 + ε25 + γ(β − 2fg). (E-1)
Also, solving (C-28’) for ε3 gives
ε3(α5, ε5) = γs±
√
(γs)2 − 2α5ε5 + γ(β − 2hg). (E-2)
We can distinguish four different cases as follows:
Case1 :α3 = γs+
√
A and ε3 = γs+
√
B, (E-3)
Case2 :α3 = γs+
√
A and ε3 = γs−
√
B, (E-4)
Case3 :α3 = γs−
√
A and ε3 = γs+
√
B, (E-5)
Case4 :α3 = γs−
√




where A ≡ −2α5ε5 + ε25 + (γs)2 + γ(β − 2fg) and B ≡ −2α5ε5 + (γs)2 + γ(β − 2hg).
We impose A ≥ 0 and B ≥ 0 to ensure that α3 and ε3 are real numbers.




















































Parameters, α5 and ε5, can be obtained by solving these equations.
Consider Case 4. We set parameters as ρ = 0.04, δ = 0.05, c = 0, k = 1, v = 10,
β = 5, τ = 3, γ = 8. We assume that γ is higher than β to avoid multiple equilibria.
The numerical analysis indicates that （E-7）and（E-8）crosses at E in the fourth
quadrant, as shown in Figure 1. The point E is the only one point of intersection
of（E-7）and（E-8）which satisfies the conditions of (D-2)-(D-4), A ≥ 0, and B ≥ 0.
Moreover, all other parameters are uniquely determined by other equations. Case 1 and
Case 2 can be ruled out because of (D-2). The solution to Case 3 violates the condition
(D-3). Therefore, the numerical analysis indicates that the simultaneous equations
(C-19)-(C-30) have a unique solution under restrictions.　
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